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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1990). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court correctly granted summary 
judgment when the plaintiff failed to provide competent evidence 
to support a products liability claim? 
2. Whether the trial court correctly denied plaintiff 
leave to amend her complaint to include a claim under the res 
ipsa loquitur doctrine? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court reviews a trial court's grant of summary 
judgment under a "correctness standard." Kitchen v. Cal Gas Co., 
Inc.. 821 P.2d 458, 460 (Utah App. 1991). 
The trial court's broad discretion to deny a leave to 
amend a pleading will only be disturbed if it is found to be an 
abuse of discretion. Hill v. State Farm. 183 U.A.R. 70, 74 
(1992). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
The Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 provides in part: 
(c) [t]he judgment sought shall be rendered 
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and 
admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law. 
(e) [w]hen a motion for summary judgment is 
made and supported as provided in this 
rule, an adverse party may not rest upon 
the mere allegations or denials of his 
pleading, but his response, by 
affidavits or as otherwise provided in 
this rule, must set forth specific facts 
showing that there is a genuine issue 
for trial. If he does not so respond, 
summary judgment, if appropriate, shall 
be entered against him. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) provides in part: 
[a] party may amend his pleading once as 
a matter of course at any time before a 
responsive pleading is served, or if the 
pleading is one to which no responsive 
pleading is permitted and the action has 
not been placed upon the trial calendar, 
he may so amend it at any time within 
twenty days after it is served. 
Otherwise, a party may amend his 
pleading only by leave of court or by 
written consent of the adverse party; 
and leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-6 provides the following: 
In any action for damages for personal 
injury, death or property damage allegedly 
caused by a defect in a product: 
(1) No product shall be considered to 
have a defect or to be in a defective 
condition, unless at the time the 
product was sold by the manufacturer or 
other initial seller, there was a defect 
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or defective condition in the product 
which made the product unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer. 
(2) As used in this act, "unreasonably 
dangerous" means that the product was 
dangerous to an extent beyond which 
would be contemplated by the ordinary 
and prudent buyer, consumer or user of 
that product in that community 
considering a product's characteristics, 
propensities, risks, dangers and uses 
together with any actual knowledge, 
training, or experience possessed by 
that particular buyer, user or consumer. 
(3) There is a rebuttable presumption 
that a product is free from any defect 
or defective condition where the alleged 
defect in the plans or designs for the 
product or the methods and techniques of 
manufacturing, inspecting and testing 
the product were in conformity with 
government standards established for 
that industry which were in existence at 
the time the plans or designs for the 
product or the methods and techniques of 
manufacturing, inspecting and testing 
the products were adopted. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case and Proceedings Belov. 
The plaintiff brought this personal injury lawsui 
based on allegations that she sustained injuries caused by an 
elevator's abrupt and repetitive rising and falling over a 
distance of several floors for a forty-minute period. 
In her original complaint in March 1988, the plaintiff 
alleged a strict product liability claim against defendant 
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Kimball Elevator Company ("Kimball"). (R. at lc-6.) The 
plaintiff was granted leave of court in February 1990 to add 
additional defendants. (R. at 136-37; 144-50.) Then, in 
October 1990 plaintiff sought to amend her complaint again in 
order to add a cause of action based on the doctrine of res ipsa 
loquitur. (R. at 242-53.) While that second motion to amend was 
pending, defendant Kimball moved for summary judgment because the 
plaintiff could not meet her burden of proof on her product 
liability claim. (R. at 268.) In March 1991, Judge David S. 
Young granted Kimball's motion for summary judgment and denied 
plaintiff's second motion for leave to amend. (R. at 377-78.) 
The remaining defendants then moved for summary 
judgment, asserting that they had no notice of the allegedly 
dangerous condition of the elevator. (R. at 381-93.) The trial 
court also granted that motion. (R. at 424-25.) 
The plaintiff now appeals. 
B. Statement of Facts. 
The plaintiff alleges that in 1984, while she was 
employed as a legal secretary for a law office at 185 South State 
Street, she suffered injuries due to the defective movement of an 
elevator. (R. at 341, 347-48.) The plaintiff states that on 
April 16, 1984, she left the eighth floor to go the sixth floor 
to take out the mail and make some photocopies. The plaintiff 
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contends she entered the elevator for her return trip to the 
eighth floor, the doors closed, the lights went out, and that for 
the next forty minutes she was alone in the dark elevator while 
it repetitively moved upwards several floors, abruptly stop, and 
then dropped several floors. (R. at 342-46.) The plaintiff 
asserts that this erratic and repetitive movement caused her to 
become disoriented and fall, thereby injuring her head, arms, and 
legs. (R. at 347-48.) The plaintiff claims that she attempted 
to use the elevator's emergency phone to no avail. (R. at 
348-49.) Finally, according to the plaintiff's account, the 
elevator became stuck between the fifth and sixth floors from 
where she was able to free herself by prying open the doors and 
jumping to the floor below. (R. at 351-52.) 
The evidence adduced from discovery proves that what 
the plaintiff alleges simply could not happen — the elevator 
equipment is not capable of operating in the manner described. 
Take for instance, the deposition testimony of Kimball Elevator's 
serviceman, Kenneth L. Fuller. He has been a certified elevator 
technician for more than 21 years and was responsible for 
servicing the elevators at 185 South State at the time of the 
alleged incident. (R. at 274, 291.) As part of his job, 
Mr. Fuller conducted weekly inspections and service. Mr. Fuller 
testified in his deposition that these elevators were 
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"exceptionally good elevators," that the elevators were equipped 
with numerous safety devices, and that it would be "impossible" 
for the elevators to operate in the manner described by 
plaintiff. See R. at 385 ff 8-10. 
Ross A. Harrison, another Kimball technician, has been 
an elevator serviceman for approximately 18 years. Mr. Harrison 
had serviced the elevators at 185 South State for approximately a 
two-year period prior to the alleged incident, and he experienced 
no unusual problems with them. He has never heard of an elevator 
operating in the manner described by plaintiff. See R. at 385 
M 11-12. 
A third Kimball serviceman, Ted Bambrough, has been a 
trained elevator technician for 29 years, and he also had 
serviced the elevators at 185 South State. In all of 
Mr. Bambrough's experience, he has never heard of an elevator 
doing the things described by plaintiff. See R. at 385 f 13. 
Finally, Brent J. Russon, the manager of Kimball 
Elevator, has been in the elevator business for 2 3 years. 
Mr. Russon is familiar with the elevators in question and has 
been dealing with the owners and managers of the building at 185 
South State since 1983. Based on his 23 years in the elevator 
business, Mr. Russon asserted that it was impossible for an 
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elevator to drop and stop and go and stop in the manner described 
by plaintiff. See R. at 386 ff 14-17. 
Against the significant weight of this evidence, 
plaintiff produced no facts or even theories to explain how the 
elevator could physically or mechanically do what she alleges it 
did, four years before her complaint was filed. Plaintiff has 
made no effort to identify or even suggest the defect which 
caused the elevator's allegedly erratic operation. There is no 
evidence that a special service call was made on the elevator in 
question in order to return it to operation after becoming lodged 
between the fifth and sixth floors. There were no witnesses to 
confirm even the elevator's final resting place. There is no 
record of special repairs or service on the elevator's lights, 
its telephone, or its mechanical system after the alleged 
incident. There is no report from any other users of the 
elevator that it operated either before or after in a similar 
manner. In support of her claim that the elevator was defective 
and therefore unreasonably dangerous, all the trial court had was 
plaintiff's uncorroborated allegation of an impossible event. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
This Court should affirm the district court's summary 
judgment for defendant, Kimball Elevator. The district court 
correctly found that the plaintiff failed to support her claim 
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that the elevator was defective and that the defect rendered the 
elevator unreasonably dangerous. The undisputed evidence is that 
the abrupt movements described by plaintiff are physically and 
mechanically impossible. Without some competent evidence to show 
a specific defect, the plaintiff cannot overcome the statutory 
presumption that there was no defect in the elevator. 
The district court also correctly denied the 
plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint to add a claim based on 
res ipsa loquitur. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is only 
applicable to fact situations where negligence can be clearly 
inferred from the nature of the injury itself. After two years 
of discovery, plaintiff did not produce any evidence of 
negligence, and she has yet to suggest what negligence is 
inferred from her impossible allegations. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY POUND THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SUPPORT HER STRICT LIABILITY 
CLAIM WITH COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
A. The Summary Judgment Standard: 
In Utah, a summary judgment is appropriate when no 
genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah Rules of Civil 
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Procedure 56(c). See also Ehlers & Ehlers v. Carbon County, 805 
P.2d 789, 791 (Utah App. 1991). Although caution must be applied 
in granting summary judgment, Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 
725 (Utah 1985), bare allegations unsupported by any facts are 
not sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. Hunt 
v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 415 (Utah 1990); Massey v. Utah Power & 
Light, 609 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1980). When a motion for summary 
judgment is made "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleadings" but must otherwise 
establish some showing of a genuine issue on which a claim can be 
based. Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 56(e). 
B. The Statutory Requirements; 
Products liability actions in Utah are governed by Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-15-1, et seq. (1977, amended in 1989). Utah Code 
§ 78-15-6 mandates that: 
In any action for damages for personal 
injury, death, or property damage allegedly 
caused by a defect in a product: 
(1) No product shall be considered to have a 
defect or to be in a defective condition, 
unless at the time the product was sold by 
the manufacturer or other initial seller 
there was a defect or defective condition in 
the product which made the product 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or 
consumer. 
(emphasis added). 
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Thus, under the Products Liability Act, the plaintiff 
must establish (i) that a defect or defective condition existed 
at the time the product was sold, and (ii) that the defect or 
condition caused the product to be unreasonably dangerous. 
Plaintiff's unsubstantiated claims as to what she experienced in 
the elevator do not meet this burden. Plaintiff's vaunted 
deposition testimony is nothing but an elaboration of the 
allegations in her Complaint. 
In addition, § 78-15-6 also provides a statutory 
presumption that a product is not defective when it has met 
government standards. 
There is a rebuttable presumption that a 
product is free from any defect or defective 
condition where the alleged defect in the 
plans or designs for the product or the 
methods and techniques of manufacturing, 
inspecting and testing the product were in 
conformity with government standards 
established for that industry which were in 
existence at the time the plans or designs 
for the product or the methods and techniques 
of manufacturing, inspecting and testing the 
product were adopted. 
U.C.A. § 78-15-6(3) (emphasis added). The undisputed evidence is 
that the elevator was designed, manufactured and installed in 
conformity with applicable government regulations in effect at 
that time. (R. at 278-79; 291.) 
Plaintiff suggests that because the alleged incident 
occurred before Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 
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1985) was decided, that Section 78-15-6 may not apply in this 
case. In Berry, the court declared the Act's statute of repose 
[§ 78-15-3], unconstitutional, but it invalidated the entire Act. 
In 1989, the Utah legislature reenacted the Act, amending the 
problematic Section 78-15-3, but leaving Section 78-15-6 
unchanged. Thus, Section 78-15-6 was the law at the time of the 
alleged incident in 1984, and it was the law when the trial court 
granted Kimball summary judgment in 1991. No retroactive 
application of this fundamental provision of the Act is urged or 
necessary. Rather, it is the plaintiff who wishes to escape its 
decisive effect by having Berry v. Beech Aircraft applied 
retroactively to the accident and prospectively to the trial of 
this case. 
C. The Standard Under Case Law; 
Even if there were no valid Product Liability Act at 
the time of the alleged incident, and even if the sections which 
remain unchanged in the Act's 1989 reenactment don't apply, the 
common law standard is still fatal to plaintiff's claim against 
Kimball. In the seminal case of Hahn v. Armco Steel Co.. 601 
P.2d 152 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court addressed a products 
liability action based on a roof collapse which occurred prior to 
the enactment of the Products Liability Act. In Hahn v. Armco 
Steel, the Utah Supreme Court adopted Section 402A, Restatement 
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of Torts (Second) and held that a plaintiff can recover for 
strict product liability only if it is shown that the product 
harming the plaintiff was "in a defective condition unreasonably 
dangerous to the user or consumer" of that product. 601 P.2d at 
156. 
This holding contains the two-part burden to 
demonstrate both (i) a defect in the product allegedly causing 
the harm, and (ii) the unreasonably dangerous nature of the 
product due to the defect. It is this standard, based on the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, which had been codified in 
the Utah Products Liability Act earlier in 1977. And although 
Berry v. Beech Aircraft may have later undermined the Act, it did 
not overrule Hahn v. Armco Steel and its progeny. 
The interplay of the two requisite elements of strict 
product liability is seen in stark relief in Dowland v. Lyman 
Prod, for Shooters, 642 P.2d 380 (Utah 1982), where the Court 
addressed a claim against a rifle manufacturer. Dowland sued 
because the barrel of a black powder, muzzle loaded gun exploded 
in his hand. The Utah Supreme Court expressly held that: 
In order to recover against [the] defendants, 
[the] plaintiff had the burden of showing an 
unreasonably dangerous defect in the rifle 
distributed by [the] defendants. In the 
absence of such a showing, the jury could not 
have found defendants liable even if 
defendants had failed to present any evidence 
whatsoever in their own favor. 
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642 P.2d 380, 381 (emphasis added.) In Dowland the plaintiff 
attempted to prove through four experts that a defect existed in 
the barrel's dovetail joint. But he ultimately lost because his 
experts could not show how the alleged defect caused the 
accident. The mere occurrence of the explosion in the gun's 
barrel did not suffice. And, by comparison, where the exploded 
barrel was a key trial exhibit in Dowland, here the plaintiff's 
claim of a rampaging elevator is in very serious doubt. 
Likewise, in Hahn itself, there was "substantial 
evidence" on the nature and existence of the defective welds in 
the steel joists which were involved in the collapse of the 
Fashion Place Mall roof. 601 P.2d 158. It was not sufficient 
for the plaintiff in Hahn simply to allege the roof's failure and 
then claim victory due to the unexpected collapse of the roof, a 
fact which was a widely known and uncontested event in Hahn. By 
comparison again, in this case the elevator's alleged aberrant 
operation is totally unsubstantiated. 
D. What Constitutes Competent Evidence Of A Defect Or Defective 
Condition; 
In its summary judgment motion, Kimball urged that 
because of the technical nature of the product, plaintiff should 
have expert testimony to establish the elevator's defect and how 
it caused the elevator to become unreasonably dangerous. In 
response, plaintiff asserts that "[l]ay people, such as jurors, 
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are the average users of elevators and therefore are especially 
well qualified" to make such determinations, (Appellant's Brief 
at 15). This is not the law in Utah. In Hahn nine expert 
witnesses testified as to the possible defects which caused the 
mall's roof to collapse. 601 P.2d at 154. Defective welds in 
the joist face plates were the identified culprits. Id. In 
Dowland, four experts testified about the allegedly defective 
design of the barrel's dovetail joints, but plaintiff was still 
unsuccessful because none of his experts could show how the 
supposed "defect" rendered the barrel of the gun unreasonably 
dangerous for ordinary use. 642 P.2d at 381. 
Cases like the present one, which deal with technical 
mechanical or physical phenomenon, are not within the ken of lay 
people. Normal life experience, such as being a legal secretary, 
or even a daily rider of elevators, does not make someone 
knowledgeable enough to determine whether a defect existed in an 
elevator at the time of sale by the manufacturer, what the defect 
was, and how it rendered the elevator unreasonably dangerous. 
Cases from other jurisdictions also mandate that 
product liability claims cannot succeed without competent 
evidence, specifically expert testimony in a technical case, 
demonstrating that the alleged defect exists and how that defect 
caused the equipment to be unreasonably dangerous. See M & R 
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Inv. Co, v. Anzalotti, 773 P.2d 729, 731 (Nev. 1989) (because 
plaintiff's expert witness could not establish any defect in an 
elevator's design, manufacturing, or installation, the plaintiff 
"failed to make a prima facie showing that her injury was caused 
by a defect in the product . . . •"; McCarty v. FC Kingston Co,, 
522 P.2d 778 (Ariz. App. 1974) (service station operator injured 
in fall over an automobile hoist required to show the precise 
engineering defect, in the control valve alleged to have caused 
injury); Power v. Otis Elevator Co., 409 So. 2d 389 (La. App, 
1982) (plaintiff failed as a matter of law to prove existence of 
defect due to an absence of expert testimony). 
The need for expert testimony on key elements in 
technical cases was specifically addressed in Reeves v. Geigy 
Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah 1988). In that case, 
the Utah Supreme Court held that expert medical testimony was 
required to establish that an allegedly defective drug had caused 
the plaintiff's skin injuries. Plaintiff argues that Reeves is 
not applicable because the expert testimony required in that case 
went to establish causation and "[c]ausation is not the issue in 
this case." (Appellate Brief at 15.) 
To the contrary, under both the statutory and case law 
standards, plaintiff has to prove that the defect (whatever it 
is) caused the elevator to be unreasonably dangerous for her 
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anticipated use. All of the evidence — the only evidence — on 
this key issue, is that the elevator simply can't do what 
plaintiff claims it did. Ipso facto, there is no actual or even 
inferable defect to have caused the unlikely episode. 
At the very least, the plaintiff has to prove that the 
event in question actually occurred. The exploded gun barrel, 
the collapsed mall roof, or the errant elevator is an essential 
starting point for a strict liability claim. Plaintiff hasn't 
verified that the elevator did what she claims. She hasn't 
attempted to show that it is even hypothetically capable of 
becoming the human Martini mixer she describes. In the 
evidentiary void which plaintiff leaves, the statutory 
presumption of no defect and Kimball's evidence of impossibility 
are decisive. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED PLAINTIFF 
LEAVE TO AMEND TO ADD A CLAIM FOR RES IPSA LOQUITUR. 
A. Denial of Motion to Amend was Proper in Light of Time: 
A denial of a motion to amend is within the sound 
discretion of the trial court. Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 
360, 365 (Utah 1984). In Westley v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 663 
P.2d 93 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court upheld the trial 
court's refusal for a leave to amend because: "[a]n amendment 
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would certainly have delayed the trial and the substance of 
plaintiff's new allegation was known a full year earlier when 
plaintiff discussed it in his deposition." Id. at 94. 
Similarly, the plaintiff here had adequate time to have 
included a res ipsa loquitur claim in her pleadings. The trial 
court's decision was based in substantial part on concern for 
tardy amendment: 
My concern about amending the complaint at 
this late date is this is a three year old 
case, it is an eight year old injury, and it 
seems to me if [res ipsa loquitur] were to be 
pled [it] could well have been pled before in 
terms of amendment. 
(R. at 485.) 
B. Denial of Motion to Amend was Proper in Light of Merits: 
In Stratford v. Morgan, 689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984), the 
Utah Supreme Court found no abuse of discretion where the trial 
court refused leave to amend to add a claim for adverse 
possession. The trial court was affirmed, partly because 
plaintiff lacked credible evidence to establish the adverse 
possession. Xd. at 365. There is no point in allowing amendment 
where the proposed claim is insupportable. 
The trial court's denial for leave to amend in this 
case should be affirmed for the same reason. Res ipsa loquitur 
requires the plaintiff to establish three elements. They are as 
follows: 
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(1) . . . [T]he accident was of a kind which in 
the ordinary course of events, would not have 
happened had the defendant(s) used due care, 
(2) the instrument or thing causing the injury was 
at the time of the accident under the management 
and control of the defendant, and (3) the accident 
happened irrespective of any participation at the 
time by the plaintiff. 
Kitchen v. Cal Gas, 821 P.2d 458, 464 quoting Dallev v. Utah 
Valley Regional Medical Center, 791 P.2d 193, 196 (Utah 1990) 
(quoting Moore v. James. 5 Utah 2d 91, 96, 297 P.2d 221, 224 
(1956)). This standard should be no mystery to plaintiff, as her 
counsel here also represented the successful defendant/respondent 
in Kitchen v. Cal Gas. 
* But before the plaintiff's case can be submitted to a 
jury on a theory of res ipsa loquitur, a threshold evidentiary 
foundation must be established. Kitchen v. Cal Gas, 821 P.2d 
458, 463. The plaintiff must prove the accident was more 
probably than not caused by negligence* Id. at 464. In 
affirming the trial court's denial of amendment to plead res ipsa 
loquitur in Kitchen v. Cal Gas, this Court reiterated the 
threshold based on Ballow v. Monroe, 699 P.2d 719, 722 (Utah 
1985) : 
Before a plaintiff is entitled to a jury 
instruction on res ipsa loquitur, the 
plaintiff must have presented evidence that 
the occurrence of the incident is "more 
probably than not caused by negligence." The 
plaintiff need not eliminate all possible 
inferences of non-negligence, but the balance 
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of probabilities must weigh in favor of 
negligence, or res ipsa loquitur does not 
apply. 
Kitchen, 821 P.2d 458, 464 (emphasis in the original). The 
Ballow opinion added that in some cases where "the probabilities 
of a situation are outside the realm of common knowledge, expert 
evidence may be used to establish the necessary foundational 
probabilities." Kitchen v. Cal Gas, 821 P.2d at 464, quoting 
Ballow, 699 P.2d at 722. 
Utilizing this standard, this Court in Kitchen v. Cal 
Gas found that the plaintiffs failed to meet even this first 
prong. Kitchen, 821 P.2d at 464. The plaintiffs, lacked any 
evidence, even inferential evidence from experts, to show that 
the accident would not have happened in the exercise of due care 
by the defendant, Cal Gas. 
The plaintiff in this case suffers the same fatal flaw. 
She hasn't established that the occurrence is even possible, 
notwithstanding "more probably than not caused by negligence." 
And this flaw in her case exists in the face of a statutory 
presumption that no defect exists when the elevator is installed 
and certified to governmental standards. U.S.C.A. § 78-15-6(3). 
This court has reached the same conclusion in other 
cases: 
The mere invocation of the doctrine . . . 
does not result in automatic application. In 
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order to rely on res ipsa loquitur, a 
plaintiff must first establish a sufficient 
evidentiary foundation to support application 
of this doctrine and its inference of 
negligence. 
Robinson v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 740 P.2d 262, 264-65 
(Utah App. 1985). In Robinson, the plaintiff's claim of 
negligence during a tonsillectomy was properly dismissed by 
summary judgment because she failed to produce the necessary 
expert testimony. The reason is obvious: "The mere happening of 
[an] accident . . . does not prove that the defendants were 
negligent." Horsley v. Robinson, 112 Utah 227, 186 P.2d 592, 596 
(1947). 
C. There is No Foundation to Apply Res Ipsa Loquitur to 
Plaintiff's Product Liability Claim: 
In support of her effort to employ res ipsa loquitur 
for the proof of her strict product liability claim, plaintiff 
cites to Dalley v. Utah Valley Regional Medical Center, 791 P.2d 
193, 196 (Utah 1990), asserting that plaintiff in Dalley "was not 
required to allege, much less prove, a product defect — by 
expert testimony or otherwise." (Appellate Brief at 27). The 
plaintiff in Dalley went into a Caesarean section operation 
without a burn on her leg and came out with a burn on her leg. 
The circumstances suggest negligence, regardless of medical 
testimony. 
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Dalley is hardly analogous. No allegedly defective 
product was even implicated, and Ms. Dalley had the evidence of a 
burn. The only supporting evidence plaintiff offers here is 
that her boss saw her tousled and distraught in 1984. She filed 
no report to the building about a defective elevator. She failed 
to counter evidence that it is physically impossible for the 
elevator to do what plaintiff alleges. There are no records of 
special repairs on the elevator, its lights, or the telephone at 
the time of or shortly after the alleged event. A similar 
episode has never been reported by any prior or subsequent users 
of the elevator. The very existence of the event and her injury 
is in serious doubt. 
Nevertheless, plaintiff argues that the Utah Supreme 
Court has allowed plaintiffs to rely on res ipsa loquitur in 
product liability cases, citing, Sanone v. J.C. Penney Co., 17 
Utah 2d 46, 404 P.2d 248 (1965). In Sanone, a two-year old girl 
caught her foot in a moving escalator. The girl's mother picked 
her up to help her and found "the skin and muscle tissue of [the 
girl's] leg had been severely torn. From the evidence and the 
pictures, there appears to be a deep and severe laceration and 
scarring of the leg from just below her knee to just above her 
ankle." 404 P.2d 248, 249. 
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The majority in Sanone took judicial notice that when 
escalator accidents occur "there was something wrong in either 
the construction, maintenance or operation. . . . " 404 P.2d at 
250. It then found that because the escalator was under the 
exclusive control of the building owner, J.C. Penny, that res 
ipsa loquitur applied. Id. Then, even though the jury found no 
negligence by J.C. Penny and no defect in the escalator, the 
majority concluded that the plaintiff should recover. 
Sanone has rarely been followed as authority, probably 
due to its questionable reasoning and holding. Chief Justice 
Henriod's characteristically colorful and powerful dissent, 
concurred in by Justice Callister, articulated the majority's 
problematic analysis: 
I dissent. The plaintiff abandoned its claim 
of negligence, and relied solely on the so-
called "res ipsa loquitur" doctrine. . . . 
Plaintiff abandoned a theory based on 
negligence, the burden of which necessarily 
was his. In this case 100% reliance was 
placed upon the defectiveness of an 
escalator. The jury held this escalator was 
not defective. That should have ended this 
case. . . . The jury said there was nothing 
wrong with the escalator, but anyway, [the 
defendant] should respond. This not only is 
inimical to the historical concept that no 
one is liable without fault, but espouses the 
dangerous doctrine that one is an insurer 
against injury, regardless of the pleadings, 
common sense or the facts. 
404 P.2d at 250-51 (emphasis added). 
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Sanone should be disregarded. Kimball is a 
manufacturer and maintainer of the elevator, not its owner. The 
opinion makes an owner of an escalator the insurer of a 
passenger's safety by imposing liability where there was no 
showing of negligence or product defect. This is expressly 
contrary to the public policy stated in Hahn v. Armco Steel, 601 
P.2d at 157. Sanone is also inapposite because there was a clear 
connection between the escalator's operation and the plaintiff's 
injuries in that case; again in the present case, there is no 
acute injury or corroborated connection between the elevator's 
allegedly aberrant operation and the plaintiff's injuries which 
were four years old before they were first asserted. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court's order of summary judgment should be 
affirmed. Judge David S. Young correctly f.and that plaintiff 
has not made a triable claim for strict liability. The statute 
presumes no defect. Plaintiff has produced no evidence which 
contradicts the unanimous testimony of Kimball's experts that 
plaintiff's claim is impossible. Res ipsa loquitur cannot be 
used to infer a defect because plaintiff has not met the 
foundational threshold for that evidentiary doctrine to apply. 
Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend to add a 
negligence claim supported by res ipsa loquitur is flawed for the 
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same reasons as is her claim for product liability. She has not 
established either the foundational requirements of a negligence 
case or the circumstantial evidence deserving of an inference of 
negligence. The trial court correctly denied plaintiff's motion 
to amend. / 
DATED this J^ */ day of ZJu/)^ , 1992. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
_
 reric]cs~ 
:torney£ for Kimball 
Elevator Company 
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